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The past 30 years has been marked by rapid growth in mandated 
employer contributions for social insurance programs in both the 
United States and abroad. Payroll taxation is a large and growing 
source of public finance in the United States: 38 percent of federal rev 
enues in 1993 were raised by payroll taxation while this figure was 
only 12.4 percent percent in 1960 (Economic Report of the President 
1992). This corresponds to a similar growth in the reliance on payroll 
taxation in other developed countries. For example, the payroll tax rate 
in Sweden grew from 6 percent in 1950 to 40 percent by the late 1970s 
(Holmlund 1983). At the same time, employer-mandated provision of 
insurance benefits to workers has risen as well, through programs such 
as Workers' Compensation in the United States and maternity leave in 
both the United States and many other nations.
The growth in employer-financed social insurance programs has 
been criticized along a number of dimensions. Perhaps the most 
important criticism has been that payroll taxation and other mandates 
raise labor costs, thereby reducing competitiveness and leading to dis- 
employment. This argument has found casual support in the high level 
of unemployment in Europe, where employer mandates have grown 
rapidly since 1960. Furthermore, payroll taxation and, in particular, 
lump-sum employer mandates have been labeled inequitable relative to 
broad-based income taxation.
The purpose of this chapter is to assess these criticisms of man 
dated employer contributions in the United States. This type of analy 
sis is particularly important now given the recent proposal to finance 
the largest social welfare program of the last 60 years, National Health
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Insurance, through an employer mandate. In the debate over the wis 
dom of employer-mandate-financed health reform, the criticisms noted 
above have taken center stage. Furthermore, as I show below, payroll 
taxes represent the majority of the tax burden for over 80 percent of 
taxpayers in the United States, highlighting the importance of assess 
ing the efficacy of this particular mode of raising revenue.
I analyze payroll taxation and employer mandates in the United 
States in four steps. First, I present a brief overview of payroll tax 
financed and employer-mandated social insurance programs in the 
United States. Second, I discuss the basic theory and evidence on the 
labor-market effects of payroll taxes and employer mandates, high 
lighting the similarity between the two types of interventions. I note 
that while there is a growing body of reduced form literature, suggest 
ing that the costs of mandated benefits and payroll taxes can be shifted 
to wages, we still have not resolved the critical structural question of 
whether this shifting is due to full valuation of these benefits or inelas 
tic labor supply.
I then extend this basic analysis to consider a number of real world 
complications in analyzing the labor-market effects of these interven 
tions: minimum wage constraints on wage shifting; group-specific 
mandates which cause employer costs to rise significantly more for 
some types of workers than for others; and the fact that many mandates 
are a fixed cost of employment which may distort the margin of hours 
choice. Finally, I consider the efficiency and equity implications of 
shifting the financing of federal social insurance programs from the 
payroll tax to the income tax and of removing the current cap on earn 
ings subject to federal payroll taxation.
I conclude with two points. First, while we have learned much in 
recent years about the effects of payroll taxation and mandates on the 
labor market, there remain a number of important unanswered ques 
tions. Second, there is a critical gap in the empirical literature which 
makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions as to the overall efficacy of 
government interventions financed by payroll taxes and mandates: 
information on the benefits of these interventions for the affected par 
ties.
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BACKGROUND ON PAYROLL TAX FINANCED AND 
MANDATED PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES'
Payroll Tax Financed Programs
At the federal level, there are three major payroll tax financed pro 
grams. The first is Social Security (SS), which provides income sup 
port to workers upon their retirement (at age 62 or greater). 2 The 
program is "unfunded;" that is, the benefits paid to current retirees are 
financed by taxation of current workers. Social Security benefit levels 
are not a direct function of the taxes paid by a worker but rather of his 
or her earnings history; earnings in the highest 35 of the 40 earnings 
years from age 21 to age 60, relative to average earnings in the econ 
omy, are used to determine benefits levels. Earnings histories are then 
translated to benefits through a formula that, in effect, favors low wage 
workers. 3 Benefits are paid as an annuity, yielding a fixed amount (in 
real terms) from the point of retirement until death.
Benefits to retirees are financed by equal payroll taxation of work 
ers and firms. Wages, salaries, and self-employment income are tax 
able; other forms of capital income, such as dividends, are not. Both 
sides of the payroll tax are capped at the "Social Security Taxable 
Maximum" earnings, so that the average tax burden is actually decreas 
ing with wages above this maximum. In recent years, payroll tax col 
lections have greatly exceeded benefit expenditures, with the 
difference being used to create a trust fund for financing the retirement 
of the baby boomers. This trust fund is projected to be insufficient to 
meet the needs of future cohorts, however, leading to recent proposals 
to slow the growth of Social Security benefits and/or raise tax rates. 
This highlights the importance of reconsidering the fundamental struc 
ture of social insurance financing.
The second federal payroll tax financed program is Disability 
Insurance (DI), which provides income benefits to workers who have 
become so disabled that they must leave the labor force. The structure 
and financing of DI is very similar to Social Security along a number 
of dimensions: individuals must have worked a minimum number of 
quarters, and benefits are based on past earning history. Unlike Social 
Security, however, there is no age restriction on the receipt of benefits.
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The major restriction, instead, is that individuals be physically or men 
tally incapable of gainful employment. Disability is assessed in a com 
plicated (and highly imperfect) process, which begins with state 
examination boards and which can be ultimately appealed to the fed 
eral level.4
The third program is Medicare, public health insurance for all per 
sons age 65 and above. Medicare consists of two parts. Part A 
finances the hospital expenditures of the elderly (along with some 
copayment by the elderly themselves). This part of Medicare is 
financed by a payroll tax similar to that of Social Security, levied 
equally on workers and firms. The Medicare payroll tax differs in two 
important respects from the Social Security payroll tax, however: it is 
much lower and, in recent years, the taxable maximum has greatly 
exceeded that for Social Security and the cap was removed altogether 
in 1994. The second part of Medicare, Part B, finances physician 
expenditures of the elderly. This portion of Medicare is financed by 
premium payments by elders and from general revenues.
Table 1 presents the history of the tax rates and taxable maxima for 
the major federal payroll tax financed programs. There was a dramatic 
rise in both the tax rate and the taxable maximum from 1950 to 1980. 
Thereafter, both have continued to rise, but at a much slower pace 
(except for the Medicare taxable maximum, which again rose rapidly 
in recent years). The fraction of workers under the taxable maximum 
has remained relatively constant in recent years. The growth in the size 
of these programs is documented in Table 2. Each program has grown 
very rapidly over time, although the growth of Medicare has recently 
been the fastest.
At the state level, the major payroll tax financed program is Unem 
ployment Insurance (UI), which provides limited income support to 
workers who lose their jobs. Qualification for UI is a function of state- 
specific minimum work requirements. Benefits are then paid to indi 
viduals who are laid off, but not (in most states) those who quit or are 
fired for cause. Benefits are a redistributive function of previous earn 
ings, with a minimum and maximum benefit and less than one for one 
conversion of wages to benefits in between, and are generally paid for 
26 weeks. UI is financed by payroll taxation of employers, up to a tax 
able maximum of earnings. 5 Employers tax rates are partially experi-





















































































































































a Figures in first four columns are tax rates, levied equally on employees and employers.
b Nominal dollars.
SS: Social Security; DI: Disability Insurance.
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SOURCE: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1991). 
NA = Program did not exist in these years.
ence rated as a function of previous layoff histories; see Anderson and 
Meyer (1993) for details.
Table 3 presents details of UI payroll taxation in 1993 and histori 
cally. UI payroll tax rates, as measured by the maximum rate, are 
fairly high, reaching 10 percent in some states. The tax base, however, 
is fairly small. In 1993, many states had taxable maxima below 
$10,000 of earnings; for the federal FUTA tax, the base was only 
$7,000. The striking historical trend, particularly in comparison to 
Table 1, is the falling coverage of the UI taxable wage base. In 1947, 
over 90 percent of wages were covered in most states; by 1990, many 
states' bases extended to less than 30 percent of payroll.
Employer Mandates for Employee Workplace Benefits6
Along with the payroll tax financed programs discussed above, 
employers in the United States also are mandated to provide a wide
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SOURCE: Committee on Ways and Means (1993).
Payroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 191
variety of benefits for their workers. Federal law explicitly mandates 
the provision of maternity leave to most employees in firms with more 
than 50 employees (under the Family and Medical Leave Act). While 
not requiring employers to offer health insurance, federal law regulates 
the structure of insurance for those firms that do offer coverage, man 
dating the inclusion of comprehensive maternity health insurance cov 
erage (under the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act) and continuation 
of coverage benefits (under the 1986 Consolidated Omnibus Reconcili 
ation Act) in health insurance packages. 7
State law in 48 states mandates that employers purchase workers' 
compensation (WC) insurance against workplace injuries. 8 Workers' 
compensation is the oldest and largest mandated benefit in the United 
States, with benefit payments amounting to $37 billion in 1990. This 
program pays both the medical bills of the injured worker and an 
indemnity benefit, which is a redistributive function of their pre-injury 
wage (the benefits structure is similar to that of UI). States legislate the 
level of benefits that must be paid to workers for a variety of different 
types of injuries. Firms can then purchase insurance from either the 
state or private firms to cover these costs or (in most states) they can 
self-insure. Workers' compensation insurance costs averaged 2.1 per 
cent of payroll in 1987, but there was a high variance. Table 4, from 
Gruber and Krueger (1991), shows the level and change in workers' 
compensation costs for the trucking industry from 1978 to 1987. 9 
These costs grew dramatically during the 1980s, due both to rising 
medical costs and to changes in state benefits legislation, and costs 
were over 25 percent of payroll in some states in 1987.
States also mandate that employers include a number of particular 
benefits in their health insurance packages. There are over 1,000 such 
"state mandated benefits," covering benefits ranging from alcoholism 
treatment to in vitro fertilization (see Gruber [1994b] for details). In 
addition, several states mandate the provision of insurance to tempo 
rarily disabled workers. There are also a variety of mandates for mini 
mal levels of workplace safety at both the federal and state levels, in 
addition to the compensation for workplace accidents provided by WC.







































































































































































































SOURCE: Gruber and Krueger (1991) 
a Change is in percentage points.
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THE INCIDENCE OF PAYROLL TAXATION AND 
EMPLOYER MANDATES
Basic Model
Figure 1 displays the standard diagrammatic analysis of the labor- 
market effects of payroll taxation levied on the firm. The market is ini 
tially in equilibrium at the intersection of the labor supply (S0) and 
demand (D0) curves, at the employment and wage package (L0,W0)- 
Payroll taxation of an amount T lowers the amount that the firm can pay 
for a given level of employment, shifting labor demand inward to Dj. 
This reduces the wage that workers are paid to W\, and employment 
falls to LI\ the tax has a deadweight loss equal to the area ABC. The 
difference L0 - LI represents the disemployment effect of payroll taxa 
tion highlighted by critics of this form of revenue raising. This analy 
sis applies equally well to a mandate that costs the employer a fraction 
1 of wages (such as workers' compensation); this mandate raises the 
cost of hiring workers, shifting demand inward and leading to disem 
ployment.
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However, this basic tax incidence diagram misses an important 
feature of payroll taxes and mandates: tax/benefit linkages. Most of 
the payroll taxes described above, such as those for Social Security, 
disability insurance, and unemployment insurance, are financing bene 
fits to the workers who are taxed. Similarly, mandates such as that for 
maternity leave or workers' compensation are providing (potentially) 
valuable benefits to workers in the firms that are affected by the man 
date. This tax/benefit linkage is not perfect; for many workers, one 
more dollar of taxation does not represent one more dollar of benefits. 
The fact that such a linkage exists, however, affects this analysis. The 
key point is that, since some of taxes paid come back to the worker in 
the form of future benefits, the disemployment effects of payroll taxes 
will be reduced because workers will be more willing to accept lower 
wages.
This point is illustrated in Figure 1 . In the presence of tax/benefit 
linkages, workers are now receiving higher net compensation than in 
the pure tax case, because the tax is buying them some benefits. Work 
ers are therefore more willing to work for a given wage, shifting labor 
supply outward to Si . As a result, employment falls only to L^. That 
is, due to this tax/benefit linkage, there is a much smaller distortion 
from payroll taxation: the deadweight loss from taxation has been 
reduced from ABC to DBF.
The extent of the tax/benefit linkage will depend on the extent to 
which workers perceive that the taxes are returned to them as benefits. 
If every dollar of taxes paid were perceived by the worker to be return 
ing in benefits, this would not be viewed as a tax at all, and there would 
be no distortion. 10 This can be readily seen in the simple model used 
by Gruber and Krueger (1991), for the case of a lump sum mandate. 
Suppose that labor demand (Ld) is given by:
(1) 
and that labor supply (Ls) is given by:
(2)
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where C is the cost of the mandate, W is the wage rate, and ocC is the 
employee valuation of the mandated benefit. In equilibrium, the effect 
of the mandate on wages will be:
dWI dC = - (t| D - ari s) / (r| D - t| s) (3)
where T| D and T| s are the elasticities of demand for and supply of labor, 
respectively. It is clear from this equation that, if a = 1, there will be 
full shifting of the cost of the mandate to wages, and no effect on 
employment as a result. On the other hand, for a = 0, this expression 
simplifies to that for the incidence of a payroll tax in the absence of tax 
benefit linkages. The analysis would be similar for a marginal payroll 
tax rather than a lump sum mandate; in that case, a would measure the 
employee's valuation on the margin.
There are two key points that must be noted in reference to this 
analysis and that of Summers (1989). First, the general distinction 
between payroll taxes and mandates is a false one. The salient feature 
is not the form of revenue raising but the extent of tax/benefit linkages. 
In both cases, employers are paying some cost and employees are 
receiving some benefit. This point is made most starkly by contrasting 
Unemployment Insurance, a payroll tax financed benefit, with Work 
ers' Compensation, a mandated employer-provided benefit: in both 
cases, employers pay some fixed portion of their payroll to insure their 
workers. If the perceived benefits of working an additional hour under 
each program is the same, and the payroll cost to the employer for that 
hour is the same, these programs will have exactly the same effect on 
the labor market. Of course, in practice there are some important dif 
ferences, such as the fact that mandates are often lump sum while pay 
roll taxes are not (a point I return to below), but as a matter of general 
principle the two can be analyzed in a parallel manner.
Second, a key determinant of tax/benefit linkages for both man 
dates and payroll taxes will be the extent to which benefits are provided 
to both workers and nonworkers. If equal benefits are provided to non- 
workers, then there is no linkage between taxes paid and benefits 
received, because individuals could have not worked and received the 
same benefit. This point is especially important when assessing the 
efficiency implications of financing National Health Insurance through 
an employer mandate. If, as seems politically likely, coverage is
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extended to the unemployed for free, or at least at a highly subsidized 
rate, it will mitigate any tax-benefit linkages for workers and may 
increase the efficiency cost of financing.
Evidence
Research on the incidence of payroll taxation has a long history. 
Early incidence research involved time-series studies of changes in 
payroll taxes in the United States and abroad. This research produced 
mixed results. Brittain (1972) reported that the payroll tax was fully 
shifted to wages, but his finding was criticized by Feldstein (1972). 
Vroman (1974) found that 1/4 to 1/2 of the payroll tax was shifted to 
wages in United States manufacturing. Holmlund (1983) used the 
time-series data on payroll taxes in Sweden to study a period when the 
payroll tax increased from 14 to 40 percent and found that roughly 50 
percent of the tax was shifted to wages in the short run. A different 
approach was pursued by Hamermesh (1979), who used the variation 
in payroll tax rates due to the Social Security payroll tax limit to esti 
mate wage offsets. His estimates indicated that from 0 to 35 percent of 
the Social Security tax is shifted to wages.
This "first generation" of studies, however, generally suffered from 
being unable to control for important potential omitted variables. In 
the time-series studies, for example, there may have been unobserved 
economic trends that affected both wages and tax-setting institutions. 
What is needed to overcome these problems is variation in employer 
costs within arguably homogenous locations over time, so that both 
time and location omitted variables can be controlled for in the analy 
sis.
More recent research has attempted to follow this approach, using 
variation across U.S. states in the cost of employer mandates and pay 
roll taxes. Gruber and Krueger (1991) studied the incidence of work 
ers' compensation; as noted previously, even though a mandated 
benefit in name, workers' compensation is similar to a payroll tax for 
the purposes of incidence analysis. We model wage incidence by 
exploiting the large change in workers' compensation costs over time 
and across states in several high cost industries during the 1980s. 
Table 4 shows that this variation is quite sizeable in the trucking indus 
try. Using a large sample of workers in these industries from the Cur-
198 Gruber
rent Population Survey, we find that 85 percent of this cost increase 
was shifted to wages. We are able to exactly replicate our micro-data 
findings using aggregate industry/state/year data on wages. Further 
more, using this source of data on employment, we find no significant 
employment decrease from these increases in workers' compensation 
cost.
Anderson and Meyer (1997) focused on the incidence of the 
Unemployment Insurance payroll tax at both the market and firm level, 
using a very large dataset of individual UI wage records from several 
states. UI tax costs differ systematically across markets due to differ 
ences across states in the structure of the experience rating schedule. 
The costs also differ across firms due to different firm locations on that 
schedule (which imperfectly ties a firm's current tax rate to its past lay 
off experience). These tax costs have changed over time at both the 
state and firm level due to legislated changes in experience rating 
schedules. Anderson and Meyer found that there is full shifting of 
market level differences in UI costs but not full shifting of firm level 
differences. Thus, the more recent evidence, which uses legislative 
variation in payroll costs across states, seems to suggest that payroll 
taxes and mandates are fully shifted to wages.
What Can We Learn from the Empirical Work?
This new reduced form evidence, however, leaves an important 
structural question unanswered. In the simple labor-market framework 
above, there are two reasons why increased costs might be shifted to 
wages: because individuals value the benefits that they are getting fully 
or because labor supply is perfectly inelastic. 11 Disentangling these 
alternatives is very important for future policy analysis. Consider the 
example of national health insurance, which is financed by a mandate 
and an additional payroll tax to cover nonworkers. If full shifting is 
due to full employee valuation with a somewhat elastic labor supply, 
then national health insurance will have important disemployment 
effects because supply will not shift for a policy not restricted to work 
ers. If full shifting is driven by inelastic supply, however, then the pop 
ulation receiving benefits is irrelevant. In either case, the costs will be 
passed onto workers' wages, so national health insurance will not 
cause disemployment.
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There is no evidence which bears on this question in Gruber and 
Krueger (1991). Anderson and Meyer (1997) provided some informa 
tion in their firm/market level distinction, but it is not enough to distin 
guish the two structural hypotheses. It seems likely that both the 
elasticity of labor supply between firms is higher than that between 
markets and that employees may not value the extra marginal cost to 
the firm from experience rating. Both of these structural interpreta 
tions would therefore be consistent with their finding. Evidence from 
elsewhere in the empirical labor economics literature suggests that the 
labor supply of prime age males is fairly inelastic, while the labor sup 
ply of secondary earners is somewhat more elastic, but there is consid 
erable uncertainty about the reliability of previous attempts to measure 
this crucial parameter (Heckman 1993).
What is needed to convincingly disentangle these views is some 
variation in one or the other of these dimensions only. For example, is 
the incidence of employer mandates/payroll taxes significantly differ 
ent across groups with plausibly different elasticities of labor supply, 
such as married men and married women? Is there differential inci 
dence with respect to elements of a policy that are likely to be valuable, 
such as cash benefits for work injury, as opposed to elements that are 
less likely to be valued, such as insurance administrative loading fac 
tors?
There are two additional limitations in applying the reduced form 
results from past research to modeling the incidence of future govern 
ment interventions, or even the incidence of other programs. The first 
is that this research has examined the medium to long run incidence of 
the cost of mandates and payroll taxes. 12 The short run incidence is 
much more uncertain. It is often assumed that shifting to wages does 
not occur through nominal pay cuts but, rather, due to worker money 
illusion, through inflation erosion of the real wage. 13 There is little 
work addressing the important questions of whether incidence signifi 
cantly differs in the short and long run or whether it varies according to 
differences in the inflationary environment when the mandate is 
enacted.
Second, the extent of tax/benefit linkages may vary substantially 
across different interventions. National health insurance provided to 
nonworkers is one example of a program with no tax/benefit linkages 
so that the existing incidence studies may not be relevant; this is also
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true for Medicare. For Social Security, the extent of tax/benefit linkage 
varies along a number of dimensions: it is lower for high wage earners 
due to the progressive manner in which earnings are converted to bene 
fits; it is lower (and often zero) for secondary earners because they 
receive the higher of their accrued benefit and 50 percent of their 
spouse's benefit so that often their earnings record is irrelevant; and it 
is zero for workers in the five lowest earning "dropout years," which 
are not used in benefits computation. Furthermore, the perceived tax/ 
benefit linkage may be weaker still because workers may not under 
stand that the "PICA" contribution on their pay stub is actually a form 
of retirement savings. The recently announced policy of informing 
workers as to their retirement savings entitlement under SS might serve 
to improve the efficiency of SS financing, to the extent that it increases 
perceived tax/benefit links. Future work which could cleverly incorpo 
rate these different kinds of linkages could ideally answer the structural 
question posed previously.
Equity
In interpreting the empirical work in this area, it is important to 
understand the goal of government policy. If the government is inter 
vening to correct a market failure and the payroll tax/mandate is simply 
a means of financing that intervention, then shifting to wages can be 
viewed as the "price" that is being paid for government provision of 
insurance. In the case of full valuation, perhaps due to adverse selec 
tion in the private insurance market, government mandates will be an 
efficient and equitable policy; the mandate is a perfect "benefits tax."
If the goal of a mandate is not to correct a market failure, however, 
but rather to provide benefits to some deprived group in society, then 
full shifting to wages may not be viewed as a desirable outcome. 
Rather, this may be viewed as the mandate being "undone" by the 
adjustment of wages. In this case, the additional deadweight loss from 
broad-based financing that does not have tax/benefit linkages may be a 
price that society is willing to pay in order to direct more resources 
towards one group. Thus, it is important to understand the goal of gov 
ernment mandate policy: is it to correct a market failure or to redirect 
resources across groups? 14
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THE MINIMUM WAGE
The analysis above assumed that firms could readily pass on their 
costs of taxation to workers in the form of lower wages. However, if 
workers are already earning the minimum wage, such "shifting to 
wages" is not possible. This is illustrated in Figure 2, for the case 
where the minimum wage is equal to the equilibrium wage pre-tax. In 
this case, a tax on firms causes a much larger fall in employment 
because worker wages cannot be reduced, so that the net compensation 
cost to the firm has risen. Employment now falls to L2 and the pres 
ence of the minimum has increased the disemployment effects of taxes 
levied on firms. This disemployment effect is independent of the valu 
ation of the benefit by workers since equilibrium is determined on the 
demand side of the market; the shift in the supply curve to S\ has no 
effect on employment or wages.
How important is this effect quantitatively? Recent research (Card 
1992a,b; Katz and Krueger 1992; Card and Krueger 1994) has shown 
that changes in the minimum wage cause no significant decrease in 
employment and may actually cause increases. 15 There are two possi 
ble interpretations of these findings, both of which suggest that the 
minimum is a less important consideration for the incidence of 
employer taxation than is implied by Figure 2.
The first, which takes the employment increase estimates seriously, 
is that the neoclassical model is not appropriate and that low-wage 
labor markets are more precisely described by a monopsony model. 
The effect of payroll taxation or mandates in such a model is shown in 
Figure 3. Demand is described by curve D0, supply is curve SQ , and the 
marginal factor cost is curve MFC0 . The competitive wage is Wc, and 
the competitive employment level is Lc ; the monopsony wage is Wm 
and the monopsony employment level is Lm . When a minimum wage is 
imposed at Wmm , employment rises for the monopsonist to Lmm . This is 
the positive employment effect estimated by some of these studies.
In such a model, a small mandate or payroll tax shifts demand to 
Dj. There is no effect on employment from this change; it is paid out 
of employer profits. Thus, a small mandate or payroll tax acts as a pure 
profits tax in this model. A larger policy change, however, can have 
real effects. If demand falls all the way to D2 (if the increased cost to
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Figure 2 Labor-Market Effects of Payroll Taxation, with an Effective 
Minimum Wage
= Wmln
Figure 3 Labor-Market Effects of Payroll Taxation, with an Effective 
Minimum Wage under Monopsony
MFC0
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the employer is larger than the difference between the competitive 
wage and the minimum wage), then employment will fall to the same 
level as in the competitive case (L2). The employment change, how 
ever, will still be smaller than in the competitive case because some of 
the cost of the mandate has still been absorbed in profits.
The second interpretation of the new minimum wage research is 
that it provides evidence of fairly inelastic labor demand in the low 
wage labor market. Indeed, even the traditional time series studies of 
the effects of the minimum wage suggested elasticities of demand as 
low as 0.1 (Brown, Gilroy, and Kohen 1982). In this case, once again, 
the minimum will not cause mandates to have significant disemploy- 
ment effects, as the cost primarily is paid from profits or prices. So, 
under either interpretation, the "new" minimum wage research sug 
gests that the minimum wage may not be an important impediment to 
the shifting of mandate costs to wages.
GROUP-SPECIFIC MANDATES
Analytical Framework
The previous analysis has highlighted the parallels between 
employer mandates and payroll taxation. However, there are many 
important differences between these two forms of regulation in prac 
tice. The first is that, unlike payroll taxes, which are generally uniform 
across all workers, mandates may cause employer costs to rise signifi 
cantly more for one group of workers than for another. This can arise, 
for example, because the mandate is explicitly group specific, as in the 
case of maternity leave legislation. Alternatively, it can arise due to 
experience rating in private insurance markets, which raises the costs 
of insuring some workers above the costs of others. For example, man 
dated workers' compensation insurance in an experience-rated firm 
costs much more for a very accident-prone worker than for a safe one. 
Similarly, mandated health insurance costs significantly more for 
sicker workers, as well as for married workers and those with large 
families. Such problems could arise with payroll taxation in theory, 
but payroll tax costs rarely vary by worker characteristic. 16
204 Gruber
Group-specific differences in costs may complicate the analysis of 
a mandate's effects. If the group that benefits from the mandate (group 
A) fully values the intervention at the cost to the employer and if 
employers are able to shift those costs to group-specific wages, then 
there will be no effect of the mandate on either that group or on other 
groups (group B). That is, for group A, the analysis will be the same as 
above; since the employer costs have not changed for group A, there is 
no spillover onto other segments of the market. 17
There may, however, be a number of barriers to full group-specific 
shifting not present in this simple model. Most obviously, there are 
antidiscrimination regulations that prohibit differential pay for the 
same job across groups or that prevent differential promotion decisions 
by demographic characteristic. 18 Furthermore, workplace "norms," 
which prohibit different pay across groups, or union rules about equal 
ity of relative pay may have similar effects as antidiscrimination rules. 
These will not be important considerations for workplace-wide man 
dates or payroll taxation.
Barriers to group-specific adjustment operate in exactly the same 
fashion as the previously discussed minimum wage effects for the 
group benefiting from the'mandate. Returning to the competitive 
model, there will be disemployment of group A if there are such barri 
ers because wages cannot adjust to offset the new employer costs. As a 
result, if there is some substitutability between groups A and B, 
employers will substitute towards group B. Fears of group-specific 
disemployment were at the heart of the debate over mandated mater 
nity leave—since the cost of employing women of child-bearing age 
would rise, opponents claimed that employers would discriminate 
against this group in hiring. Thus, even with full valuation and no 
explicit regulatory barrier such as the minimum wage, there can be a 
distortion from a group-specific mandate.
Previous Evidence
Evidence on the incidence of a group-specific mandate is provided 
in Gruber (1994a). In that paper, I studied the effects of state and fed 
eral mandates that employers include comprehensive coverage for 
maternity in their health insurance plans. A commonly accepted fea 
ture of health insurance benefits before the mid 1970s was limited cov-
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erage for childbirth. Maternity coverage was sometimes excluded 
from basic health benefits; if included, it was often subject to flat rate 
cash amount limits, regardless of the cost of delivery. This differential 
coverage was widely perceived as discriminatory (Leshin 1981; Alan 
Guttmacher Institute 1987). Many states responded to this perception 
in the 1975-1978 period by passing laws prohibiting treating preg 
nancy differently from "comparable illnesses" in health insurance ben 
efits. Then, in October 1978, the Federal Government passed the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which prohibited any differen 
tial treatment of pregnancy in the employment relationship.
These laws affected a readily identifiable group, women of child- 
bearing age and their husbands (under whose insurance these women 
may have been covered), so that I was able to study the impact of these 
laws based on observable characteristics. They were also fairly costly 
for these individuals, due both to the widespread existence of differen 
tial maternity benefits before 1978 and the large fraction of health 
insurance costs which are accounted for by maternity benefits for 
women of child-bearing age. I found that there was full group-specific 
shifting: the wages of the affected groups fell by enough to offset the 
cost of the mandate to their employers. As a result, there was no effect 
on their net labor supply. Since women are generally modeled as hav 
ing much more elastic labor supply than men, the fact that there was 
full shifting for this group is suggestive that such shifting arose from 
movements in the supply curve and not from demand shifts along an 
inelastic supply curve.
Further evidence on this point is provided by Olson (1993), who 
examined the wages and health insurance coverage of single men, rela 
tive to single women and married males, during the era that saw 
increased incidence of AIDS. Olson did find a significant narrowing of 
the positive wage gap between single men and single women over this 
era, although he found no effect on the relative wages of single and 
married men. He also found that there was a drop in employer-pro 
vided health insurance for single men relative to both control groups. 19
This work suggests that employers can shift mandated costs to the 
wages of demographically identifiable groups within the workplace. 
However, it leaves unanswered the important question of how finely 
employers can shift mandated increases in benefits costs. Did the shift 
ing estimated in Gruber (1994a) arise from reduced average wages in
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firms with a high proportion of women of child-bearing age or from 
shifts in the wage structure within the workplace? In the latter case, 
how finely can the wage structure be manipulated to shift group-spe 
cific costs? The extent to which within-workplace shifting is possible 
is an important question for analyzing employer-mandated national 
health insurance. In a small firm with one very sick worker and, as a 
result, very high medical costs, it will almost certainly be impossible to 
shift these high costs to the wages of that single worker. As a result, it 
will be in the firm's interest to discriminate in the hiring of sick work 
ers. On the other hand, an entire workplace of sick workers could pre 
sumably be paid less to compensate for employer insurance costs 
differences. How large does the group of sick workers have to be 
before employers are able to shift their excess costs of health insurance 
to them? It would be useful to understand the trade-off made by firms 
between shifting costs to very small groups in the workplace and dis 
criminating in their hiring.
One means of addressing the first of these questions is to return to 
my earlier analysis and model the effect of the mandates on both indi 
vidual and firm average wages. If the earlier findings are driven by 
lower average wages in firms with many women of child-bearing age, 
then including the fraction of firm employment that is in this demo 
graphic group, or the average cost to the firm, should explain all of the 
drop in wages for this group. If there is within-workplace shifting, 
however, then the individual measure will still enter the model signifi 
cantly because there will be some explanatory power for the deviation 
of individual from firm average costs.
New Evidence—Individual or Workplace-Specific Shifting?
The data used for this analysis is the May Current Population Sur 
vey (1978) for the years 1974, 1975, 1977, and 1978. I focus on 3 of 
the 23 states that passed "maternity mandates" in the 1975-1979 
period: Illinois, New Jersey, and New York (the "experimental" 
states). 20 I also use a set of "non-experimental" states designed to cap 
ture any regional shocks to the experimental states. For Illinois, the 
control states used are Ohio and Indiana; for New Jersey and New 
York, the controls are Connecticut, Massachusetts, and North Carolina. 
The data consist of observations on all individuals in these set of exper-
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imental and non-experimental locations, for two years before the legis 
lation (1974, 1975), and two years after the legislation (1977, 1978).
The goal of the empirical work is to identify the effect of laws 
passed by certain states ("experimental states") which affected particu 
lar groups of individuals ("treatment group"). Identifying this effect 
requires controlling for any systematic shocks to the labor-market out 
comes of the treatment group correlated with, but not due to, the law. I 
do so in three ways in the estimation. First, I include year effects, to 
capture any national trends in the earnings of the treatment group. Sec 
ond, I include state effects, to control for secular earnings differences 
in the states that passed the laws and those that did not. Finally, I 
include state-by-year effects to control for state-specific shocks corre 
lated with the passage of these laws over this period; that is, I compare 
the treatment individuals in the experimental states to a set of control 
individuals in those same states and measure the change in relative out 
comes. This change is then compared to the change in relative out 
comes in states that did not pass maternity mandates to control for 
national shocks to the relative earnings of these groups. The identify 
ing assumption of this "differences-in-differences-in-differences" 
(DDD) estimator are fairly weak: it simply requires that there be no 
contemporaneous shock that affects the relative outcomes of the treat 
ment group in the same state-years as the law.
The treatment group here are those insured workers who are "at 
risk" for having a child, or whose health insurance covers someone 
who is at risk of having a child. The controls are other individuals who 
were directly unaffected by the law. However, the CPS (before May 
1979) contained no information on health insurance coverage. I am 
thus unable to exactly identify the employees for whom this was a 
costly mandate.
I address this problem in two ways in the empirical work. First, I 
use women aged 20-40 as the treatment group. This group will con 
tain the individuals for whom the mandate was most costly. My con 
trol group is all individuals over 40 and single males aged 20-40. I 
exclude 20^K)-year- old married males, who may also be affected by 
the laws if their insurance covers their wives. This "treatment dummy" 
approach has the virtue that it is relatively "nonparametric."
Second, I use data on insurance coverage from other datasets to 
model the likelihood that individuals were covered by insurance and
208 Gruber
the type of insurance coverage that they receive, and I assign each indi 
vidual a cost of the mandate based on these predictions and outside 
data on the cost of maternity health insurance. This approach has the 
advantage that I use individual variation, rather than differences across 
broad demographic groups, to identify the impact of the law. However, 
it has the disadvantage that it imposes strong parametric assumptions. 
If the functional form for the expected cost of the mandate is incorrect, 
then the demographic group dummy may be a more effective means of 
capturing the law's impact. Thus, in the empirical work, I rely on both 
the treatment group dummy and the individually parameterized cost 
measure.
I estimate regressions of the form:
Wljt = a + (Uy, + (32T, + P3o, + hTREAT, + |35o, • T, (4) 
+ p6T, • TREAT, + fadj • TREAT, + pg8, • lt • TREAT,
where i indexes individuals
j indexes states (1 if experimental state, 0 if non-experimental)
t indexes years (1 if after the law, 0 if before)
W is the log real hourly wage
X is a vector of observable characteristics
57 is a fixed state effect
T, is a fixed year effect
TREAT is a dummy for treatment group (1 if treatment, 0 if con 
trol), and 
• denotes interaction between effects
In this regression, the fixed effects control for time-series changes 
in wages (J32), the time-invariant characteristics of the experimental 
states (J33), and the time-invariant characteristics of the treatment group 
((34). The second-level interactions control for changes over time in the 
experimental states (|35 ), changes over time for the treatment group 
nationwide (b6), and time-invariant characteristics of the treatment 
group in the experimental states ((37). The third-level interaction ((38) 
captures all variation in wages specific to the treatments (relative to
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controls), in the experimental states (relative to the non-experimen- 
tals), and in the years after the law (relative to before the law). This is 
the DDD estimate of the extent of shifting of the cost of the mandate to 
group-specific wages. The set of demographic covariates used 
includes years of education, experience and its square, sex, marital sta 
tus, a marital status by sex interaction, a dummy for nonwhite, a con 
trol for union status, dummies for 15 major industries, and separate 
year dummies for 1974 and 1978.
Table 5 presents the estimates from Eq. 4. In the first column, I 
show that there is a significant fall in the wages of women of child- 
bearing age in the state that passed the mandate, relative to the control 
groups of single men and older workers, of 4.4 percent. This is some 
what larger than the average cost of the mandate for this group; I inter 
pret these magnitudes in more detail below. The coefficients on the 
demographic covariates (not reported) are of their expected signs and 
magnitudes. There is a 1.2 percent fall in wages for the within-state 
control group (the coefficient on "After»Experimental," the state-by- 
year effect). This finding has one of two implications: either the exper 
imental states, on average, saw a negative shock over this period or the 
effect of the mandates are "spilling over" onto the control group. 
These two interpretations cannot be fully distinguished within this 
framework, although the latter seems unlikely given the finding of full 
shifting to group-specific wages.
This regression is unable to disentangle whether this shifting to 
wages is the result of within-workplace wage adjustments or drops in 
average wages in firms with a high proportion of women of child-bear 
ing age. Unfortunately, I cannot precisely distinguish these alterna 
tives either because I do not have information on the firms in which 
these women work. However, I can use information on their occupa 
tion and industry to create "synthetic firms" of individuals with the 
same occupation/industry type. I do so by dividing the data into 15 
major industries and 10 major occupations, and then calculating the 
fraction of workers in each cell who are 20-40-year-old women. 21 I 
then use this in place of the individual treatment dummy in the DDD 
regression framework of Eq. 4.
The results of doing so are reported in the second column of Table 
5. In fact, there is a negative coefficient on the third level interaction in 
this regression although it is only significant at the 13 percent level.
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a Standard errors in parentheses. All regressions also include years of education, experi 
ence and its square, sex, marital status, a marital status by sex interaction, a dummy for 
nonwhite, a control for union status, dummies for 15 major industries, and separate year 
dummies for 1974 and 1978. "After" is dummy for being after mandate; "Experimental" 
is dummy for being in a state that passed a mandate. In columns 1-3, "Treatment" is a 
dummy for being a woman between 20 and 40 years old, and "Firm treatment" is the per 
centage of 20^0-year-old females in the worker's industry/occupation cell, regressions 
exclude married men In columns 4-6, "cost" is the predicted cost of mandate for the 
worker, and "Firm cost" is the average predicted cost in the worker's industry/occupation 
cell.
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The coefficient is actually more sizeable than that from the individual 
treatment regression; it implies that a workplace entirely made up of 
20-40-year-old females would see wages fall by almost 7 percent. In 
the individual regression, such a workplace would see wages fall by 
only 4 percent. Once again, however, this regression is unable to dis 
entangle whether workplace-wide shifting or within-workplace shift 
ing is the driving force behind this fall in wages.
In order to distinguish these views, I include both the individual 
and industry/occupation measure in column 3. If the results are a 
result of workplace-wide shifting, the inclusion of the average "firm" 
cost should significantly weaken the individual cost coefficient. In 
fact, the individual DDD coefficient is roughly unchanged, while the 
industry/occupation DDD coefficient falls to -0.023. Thus, the results 
imply that it is not just drops in average wages at workplaces with 
many women that is driving the basic finding. The latter estimate, 
however, is very imprecise, and one could not reject that it was either 
zero or much larger than the individual DDD coefficient.
The second empirical approach discussed above was to individu 
ally parameterize the cost of the mandate. Gruber (1992) described the 
methodology for generating individual-specific predicted increases in 
insurance costs from the mandate. The cost averages 2 percent of 
wages for the treatment individuals, but it ranges up to 28 percent of 
wages. The cost is normalized by hours per week and by predicted 
wages to yield a cost as a percentage of hourly wages, which is readily 
interpretable in this log wage framework. 22 The individually parame 
terized cost measure can be introduced in place of the treatment 
dummy in Eq. 4; to the extent that my estimate of the cost of the man 
date is correct, a coefficient of -1 on the third-level interaction would 
indicate full shifting to wages.
The results using this individual parameterization at both the indi 
vidual and the industry/occupation level are presented in columns 4-6 
of Table 5. For the individual cost regressions, there is a sizeable and 
negative coefficient that is significantly different from zero and not sig 
nificantly different from one. For the industry/occupation level cost 
measures, the coefficient is similar. When the two measures are 
entered together, the individual-level cost coefficient is essentially 
unchanged, while the industry/occupation-level cost coefficient is zero.
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Once again, however, there is a very large standard error on the indus 
try/occupation-level cost.
Thus, this work provides some evidence that the shifting to wages 
uncovered in my earlier paper arises from within-workplace changes in 
the wage structure. This evidence is only preliminary, however, due 
both to my very rough proxy for "firms" (industry/occupation cells) 
and the large resulting standard errors on the estimates. In particular, 
these findings may only be demonstrating that the individual is a better 
proxy for their own firm than is their industry/occupation cell. Future 
work, perhaps with true firm data, could fruitfully refine these esti 
mates.
COMPOSITION OF LABOR SUPPLY
Another important difference between mandates and payroll taxes 
in practice is that mandates are often lump-sum benefits, such as with 
mandated health insurance, whereas payroll taxes are paid as a fraction 
of wages. Since mandates represent an increase in the fixed costs of 
employment, they will be more costly for employees working fewer 
hours. If employers are able to shift the cost to wages in a lump-sum 
fashion and if the benefit is fully valued by employees, then there will 
be no effect on desired hours for either employees or employers. But, 
if such lump-sum shifting is impossible, then a natural employer reac 
tion to fixed cost mandates would be to increase hours and reduce 
employment. This would enable the employer to reduce the cost per 
hour of the mandate while leaving total labor input unchanged.
There may be forces, however, working in the opposite direction. 
Consider the case of a health insurance mandate. Since part-time 
workers may be readily excluded from health insurance coverage, 
employers would like to replace full-time employees with their (rela 
tively less expensive) part-time counterparts. 23 In this case, hours 
would fall and employment would rise, and total labor input would 
remain unchanged. Furthermore, the desired supply response to these 
mandates from the individual perspective is for increased employment 
among those out of the labor force and for part-time workers to 
increases their hours in order to qualify for health insurance, so that
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both employment and hours rise. Thus, the effect on hours and 
employment are uncertain, even if the cost of the mandate is able to be 
shifted to wages on average.
Evidence on this question is provided in Gruber (1994a) and Cutler 
and Madrian (1996). Gruber found that, while the cost of the "mater 
nity mandates" of the 1970s was fully shifted to wages on average with 
no effect on total labor supply, there was some compositional effect on 
labor supply: employment fell and hours of work rose, as would be 
expected under the first scenario above. This suggests that employers 
could not shift the cost of the mandates in a perfect lump sum manner 
so they adjusted on the margin using the composition of the work 
schedule. Cutler and Madrian showed that hours rose in those indus 
tries which saw the greatest rise in health care costs during the past 
decade, once again suggesting that employers are adjusting to these 
increased fixed costs using the hours margin.
Even this difference between mandates and payroll taxes, however, 
is not as large as it appears because payroll taxes are generally capped. 
For UI taxes, as noted previously, these caps can be quite low; with 
very low caps, payroll taxes essentially operate as lump-sum mandates. 
If employers can shift the proportional payroll tax cost to wages below 
the cap only and not to wages above the cap, then there will be no 
incentive to change hours for either the employer or employee. But if 
employers cannot, they may have to reduce wages proportionately for 
all workers, regardless of their position relative to the cap. In this case, 
there will be opposite hours of work incentives for employers and 
employees. Employers will see higher costs below the cap and would 
therefore like to increase work above the cap and reduce employment; 
employees will see net benefits below the cap (once again assuming 
full valuation) and only net taxes above it, so they would like to reduce 
hours and increase (below cap) employment. It would be fruitful to 
investigate the effect of payroll tax caps on the choice of hours vs. 
employment, as has been done for health insurance.
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REFORMING PAYROLL TAXATION
In this section, I consider two reforms to the current system of pay 
roll taxation. I do not discuss alternatives to mandates because the 
alternative generally is simply to not have the policy. In the final sec 
tion, I return to the overall question of whether such policies should 
exist and be financed through employers.
Financing Social Security and Disability Insurance Through 
the Income Tax
A natural alternative to financing social insurance programs 
through payroll taxation is to finance them through general revenues. 
In this section, I contrast the economic effects of payroll taxes with 
those of one form of general revenue raising, the individual income 
tax.24 In doing so, I hold the benefits side of these programs constant. 
For example, I assume that the Social Security benefits paid to retired 
workers remain a function of their lifetime work experience in the 
same way that they are under earmarked payroll taxation. In terms of 
efficiency, this implies that the tax/benefit linkage-induced shift in 
labor supply previously discussed will remain under income taxation— 
that is, so long as benefits are calculated based on past earnings histo 
ries, regardless of the source of financing, tax/benefit linkages will 
operate. Once again, the key in Summers' (1989) analysis is not the 
form of revenue raising, but that benefits are restricted to be a function 
of work effort.
In terms of equity, this approach means that I am not considering 
the net equity implication of these programs as a whole, but rather only 
the differential impact of alternative sources of finance. For example, 
the SS program as a whole may be progressive, even as the tax that 
finances this program is regressive. In this case, moving to more equi 
table income taxation would be a further increase in progressivity.
Efficiency. The deadweight loss from financing a social insurance 
program from two alternative revenue sources is a function of two fac 
tors: the breadth and the elasticity of the relative tax bases. The distor 
tion of raising a given amount of revenue will be smaller as the tax 
base is more inelastic. At the same time, if a tax base is small, the tax
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rate must be higher to raise the requisite funds; because the deadweight 
loss from a tax rises as the square of the tax rate, a higher rate will lead 
to a higher distortion. Thus, for a given level of elasticity, the dead 
weight loss will also fall as the tax base is more broad.
Income taxes offer a potentially much larger tax base than payroll 
taxation because of the inclusion of unearned income and the fact that 
payroll taxes are capped while income taxes include all wage and sal 
ary income. However, this simple intuition is rendered incorrect by the 
nature of the income tax system in the United States. The income tax 
base has a large number of exclusions (such as those for dependents, 
charitable giving, and mortgage payments) that make it a very incom 
plete measure of total income in the United States.
The base for income taxation, total taxable income, is reported by 
Internal Revenue Service. I use data from the Treasury Department's 
Individual Tax Model, along with the NBER's TAXSIM program, to 
measure the base of taxable payroll below the Social Security maxi 
mum. This data provides information on the tax returns for a large 
sample of taxpayers, and TAXSIM calculates the tax rates paid by 
those taxpayers.25 I use data from 1989, the last year for which data are 
available.
The total taxable income base was $2.173 trillion in 1989. In con 
trast, the taxable base of wage and salary earnings below the taxable 
maximum was only $12.9 million smaller, which is trivial relative to 
the size of the social insurance programs under discussion. Thus, the 
relative sizes of these tax bases are virtually equal. Capped earnings 
may be a smaller base for taxation compared with a comprehensive 
income definition, but capped earnings provide a base of roughly the 
same size compared with income taxation as it is carried out in the 
United States.
Furthermore, the elasticity of the income tax base is almost cer 
tainly higher than the elasticity of the payroll tax base. As noted ear 
lier, although controversial, the empirical literature on labor supply 
suggests that the labor supply of prime age males is fairly inelastic and 
that the labor supply of secondary earners is somewhat more elastic. 
On the other hand, other forms of income taxed under the personal 
income tax (e.g., capital gains) appear to be much more elastic with 
respect to taxation, although this evidence is also controversial (Auer- 
bach 1988). Similarly, charitable deductions, which lower the taxable
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income base, are also very sensitive to tax rates (Clotfelter 1990). 
Recent evidence also suggests that overall taxable income is more elas 
tic with respect to the tax rate than is labor income alone (Feldstein 
1993; Navratil 1994). 26
Thus, it seems clear that income taxation would be a more ineffi 
cient source of revenue raising than payroll taxation: the size of the tax 
base would be no larger, and the tax base would be more elastic.
Equity. The other important consideration for examining income 
versus payroll taxation is the distribution of the tax burden across tax 
payers. A standard criticism of payroll taxation, relative to broader 
income taxation, is that it is less equitable. This criticism is true for 
two reasons. First, unearned income is distributed in a much more pro- 
rich fashion than earned income so that a tax on all income is more 
progressive by definition. Second, payroll taxation is capped, so that 
high-income individuals escape this tax burden on income above the 
cap. In order to contrast the equity of payroll and income taxation, I 
compare the effective tax rates paid by taxpayers of different income, 
once again using data from the Treasury model and TAXSIM. Follow 
ing the evidence provided above, I assume that all of the tax is borne by 
workers in the form of lower wages. The base for my definition of 
income is "total positive income"—the sum of the positive income ele 
ments reported on tax returns, with negative elements being set to zero. 
This approach is taken to avoid the problem that much of the negative 
income reported on tax forms is tax shelter activity, rather than true 
economic losses.
The left side of Table 6 compares the distribution of effective tax 
rates across income groups under the current system for the income 
tax, the payroll tax, and the combination of the two. As expected, the 
income tax is found to be much more progressive than the payroll tax. 
For the bottom 5-10 percent of taxpayers, the effective income tax rate 
is actually negative due to the presence of the Earned Income Tax 
Credit, which subsidizes labor supply for low earners. The average 
rate then rises gradually, reaching a maximum of 17.4 percent for the 
top 5 percent of taxpayers.
In contrast, the effective payroll tax rate is virtually flat for the bot 
tom 80 percent of taxpayers. Note that for this group, payroll taxation
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a Author's tabulations using U.S. Department of Treasury tax data and NBER TAXSIM 
model.
represents the majority of their tax bill. For the top 20 percent of tax 
payers, payroll tax rates actually decline. Payroll taxes are therefore 
much less equitable than income taxes, and this becomes a key equity 
consideration when payroll taxes represent the majority of taxes paid 
for such a high fraction of taxpayers. Thus, the consideration of pay 
roll vs. income taxation comes down to the classic trade-off between 
efficiency and equity.
Of course, this discussion has taken the structure of income and 
payroll taxes as given. If the income tax base were widened, for exam 
ple, by the removal or limitation of the deduction for mortgage interest, 
the attractiveness of income taxation would rise for three reasons. 
First, the tax base would be larger, so that there would be a lower effi 
ciency cost per dollar of revenue raised. Second, the income tax base 
would be less elastic. The increased elasticity of income taxation rela 
tive to payroll taxation described above derives largely from the fact 
that, under the income tax, there are a number of ways to protect 
income from taxation, such as the mortgage interest deduction. Limit 
ing these exclusions would reduce the extent to which reported income
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can be lowered in response to higher taxes and thus limit the efficiency 
cost of income taxation. Finally, income taxes would become even 
more equitable in many cases. This is because any deduction from tax 
able income is regressive because tax rates rise with income. Thus, 
removing the mortgage interest deduction would make the income tax 
system more progressive. 27
Raising the Taxable Maximum for Payroll Taxation
An alternative to shifting to income taxation would be to change 
the structure of payroll taxation to make it more equitable. A natural 
means for doing so would be to remove the cap on taxable earnings for 
SS and DI, which was removed for Medicare beginning in 1994. 
Under the principle of maintaining some tax/benefit linkages, if bene 
fits are not going to be paid based on earnings above this level, then 
taxes must be limited as well. However, the tax/benefit linkages are 
likely to be small for this top group of earners because the benefits for 
mula used by SS only converts each dollar of earnings to 15 cents of 
benefits at the top of the earnings distribution.
The efficiency consequences of uncapping the payroll tax are 
mixed. On one hand, it substantially increases the payroll tax base. If 
all wage and salary income were subject to the payroll tax, the tax base 
would rise from $2.16 trillion to $2.61 trillion (based on calculations 
using the Treasury data and TAXSIM), an increase in the tax base of 
over 20 percent. In 1989, the total tax rate used to finance SS and DI 
was 12.12 percent. If the same revenues were raised by an uncapped 
tax, this combined tax rate could have been reduced to 10.03 percent. 
Using the rule that the efficiency cost of a tax rises with the square of 
the tax rate, the efficiency cost of financing these programs could have 
been reduced by 32 percent by extending the tax base to all wages and 
salaries.
On the other hand, the wage and salary income of top earners may 
be more elastic than that of earners lower down the income distribu 
tion. High-income individuals receive more fringe benefits and other 
diverse sources of compensation, allowing for more discretion in the 
form in which compensation is paid. For example, if the payroll tax 
were uncapped, executives might switch from cash compensation to 
stock options. While other workers have some opportunity for this
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type of arbitrage using fringe benefits such as health insurance, the 
opportunities are more abundant for top earners. Feenberg and Poterba 
(1993) documented that wage and salary income for the top 1 percent 
of taxpayers rose dramatically after the Tax Reform Act of 1986 low 
ered marginal tax rates on earned income. And Navratil (1994) also 
found that the wage and salary income of top earners (more than 
$50,000 per year in 1980 dollars) is much more elastic with respect to 
tax changes than is that of all earners.
Furthermore, to the extent that high wage earners reduce their 
reported earnings in order to avoid increased payroll taxation, there is a 
spillover into the revenues collected under the ordinary income tax. 
Since the marginal income tax rate on top earners is over three times as 
high as the marginal payroll tax rate would be, reduced earnings by top 
earners could quickly mitigate any potential gains from extending the 
payroll tax.
Navratil (1994) estimated an elasticity of earned income with 
respect to payroll taxation for high-income earners of approximately 
one. One can use this estimate, along with information on the revenues 
collected from both the payroll and income taxes, to estimate the reve 
nue effect of uncapping the payroll tax. In fact, the net revenue 
increase from uncapping the payroll tax would only be $11.7 billion, or 
21 percent of what would be assumed based on naive application of the 
12 percent payroll tax to the incremental $450 billion in revenues 
because the tax would raise only $43.2 billion in payroll tax revenues 
but would cost $31.5 billion in income tax revenues. 28 This policy 
could therefore have a relatively high efficiency cost per dollar of reve 
nues raised.
Table 6 explores the equity implications of uncapping the tax base 
by presenting the payroll and total tax burdens, by income class, under 
the current system and with the tax base uncapped. There is no effect 
of this policy on the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution. 
However, there is a large net increase in taxes paid for the wealthiest 
taxpayers; the top 5 percent would experience and increase in their 
effective tax rate of approximately 20 percent. Thus, uncapping the SS 
tax may raise a relatively small amount of revenues, but it would sub 
stantially raise taxes on the very upper end of the distribution of earn 
ings.
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Uncapping payroll taxes for UI would have larger effects since, as 
documented in Table 3, the current taxable maximums are so low. It is 
difficult to replicate the calculation performed above for uncapping UI 
taxes, however, because we do not have a good estimate of the elastic 
ity of earned income for lower wage earners, nor is there readily avail 
able data on the marginal UI tax rate faced by workers at different 
income levels. Undertaking this kind of calculation could be useful for 
assessing the implications of uncapping UI taxes as well.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has tried to highlight what we know and what we 
don't know about the labor-market effects of payroll taxation and 
employer mandates in the United States. While recent evidence sug 
gests that mandates and payroll taxes are fully shifted to workers' 
wages with little disemployment effect, there remains important ques 
tions and complications that must be explored by future research. In 
addition, I discuss the benefits and costs of shifting from payroll taxa 
tion to income taxation, as well as of uncapping the payroll tax.
There is a larger question avoided by this discussion: should pay 
roll tax financed and mandated employer benefits exist at all? There 
are three components to the welfare analysis of social insurance inter 
ventions: the deadweight loss from financing, other distortions to 
behavior from the existence of public insurance, and the benefits for 
the party on whose behalf the intervention is occurring. This chapter 
has focused on the first of these components. There is also a large liter 
ature on the second, which has explored the distortive effects of the 
perverse incentives inherent in a number of different social insurance 
programs. However, there is little work on the third area—the benefits 
of social insurance interventions. Without evidence on this front, we 
cannot conclude as to the optimal level of government intervention in 
private insurance markets.
Consider the case of workers' compensation. Gruber and Krueger 
(1991) showed that there is little deadweight loss from financing this 
program. Meyer (1990) and Krueger (1990, 1992) showed that there 
are important distortions to worker injury reports and duration of job
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absence, but there is little evidence on the benefits of WC. To what 
extent does WC reduce the deadweight loss that would otherwise be 
incurred through the tort system as workers and firms tried to resolve 
workplace injury cases? To what extent does it smooth the consump 
tion of myopic or liquidity constrained workers who would otherwise 
see a large drop in their standard of living when they were truly injured 
on the job? Until these benefits are measured, we have no way of 
assessing the optimal level of government intervention in this market; 
how else can we assess whether the distortions measured by the earlier 
work are "large"?
Similar problems exist in evaluating the optimal level of the Social 
Security program. In this case, we don't necessarily even know the 
deadweight loss from financing. There are a number of reasons, noted 
previously, why the results from previous incidence research may not 
apply to Social Security. Once again, there is a long line of research on 
the distortive effects of the program to savings and retirement behavior 
by Feldstein (1974), Burtless (1986), and Diamond and Hausman 
(1984). In this case, however, there is also only sketchy evidence on 
the benefits of the program. There has been some attention paid to 
issues of benefit adequacy; see Diamond (1977), Kotlikoff, Spivak, and 
Summers (1982), and Hamermesh (1984) for somewhat different con 
clusions on this adequacy issue. None of these studies, however, has 
been able to assess convincingly the effects of varying Social Security 
benefits on the welfare of retirees because they have not been able to 
fully model the alternative consumption smoothing opportunities avail 
able to the retiree in the absence of Social Security. Feldstein (1985) 
conjectured on the optimal Social Security benefit level using a model 
where some fraction of the population is myopic and concluded that 
the optimal program should be quite small. This work could be use 
fully extended by incorporating liquidity constraints and other capital 
market failures into the model and, more convincingly, by providing 
empirical evidence on how the living standards of the elderly change as 
Social Security benefits vary.
Perhaps the most complete picture can be painted for unemploy 
ment insurance. The evidence in Anderson and Meyer (1997) suggests 
that there is little deadweight loss at the market level from the financing 
of UI, although there may be a distortion at the firm level. Meyer 
(1990) showed that there is a large distortion of generous UI benefits to
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unemployment durations, and Feldstein (1978), Topel (1983), and 
Anderson and Meyer (1994) showed that there are also distortions of 
imperfect experience rating to firm layoff decisions. On the other hand, 
there are two forms of benefit of this program for individual workers. 
The first is that it helps to subsidize efficient search by liquidity con 
strained unemployed workers. But recent research has shown that the 
longer search induced by more generous unemployment insurance ben 
efits does not result in better job matches, as measured by the ultimate 
wage received (Meyer 1989; Woodbury and Speigelman 1987). The 
second is that it smooths the consumption of individuals who, due 
either to myopia or some capital market failure, are unable to smooth 
their own consumption during unemployment spells. 29 Some prelimi 
nary evidence on this front is provided by Gruber (1997, 1998), who 
found that the consumption of those becoming unemployed falls signif 
icantly more if there is less generous UI. In that paper, I attempted to 
use a simple optimal benefits model to compare the costs and benefits 
of UI into a simple optimal benefits model, but there is clearly room for 
more systematic incorporation of the costs and benefits of social insur 
ance programs in order to assess optimal intervention levels.
Notes
I am grateful to Jeff Liebman for research assistance.
1. The description of these programs is current as of 1993. Most information is from 
Committee on Ways and Means (1993) and Employee Benefits Research Institute 
(1992).
2. The normal age of retirement under Social Security is 65. Individuals can retire 
as early as age 62, but benefits are then adjusted downwards to reflect the fact that 
they are received for a larger number of years. Similarly, individuals can retire 
after age 65, and benefits are adjusted upwards, through a "delayed retirement 
credit." If individuals wish to both continue working and receive benefits, they 
can do so, but benefits are taxed away at a rate of $1 of benefit for every $3 of 
earnings [above some minimum threshold ($10,560)]; this is known as the "earn 
ings test."
3. Although, for past cohorts, the system actually redistributed (in total dollar terms) 
towards higher income workers; see Stuerle and Bakija (1994) for an overview. 
This trend is projected to end for future generations, as the program becomes 
more progressive.
4. The problems in defining disability for the purposes of Disability Insurance are 
well known; see Parsons (1991) for a detailed discussion of these issues
Payroll Taxes, Employer Mandates, and the Labor Market 223
5. While this is primarily a state-run program, employers are obligated to pay a 0 6 
percent payroll tax to the federal government (FUTA tax).
6. It is difficult to decide where "mandates" end and other workplace regulations 
begin. The dividing line chosen here is that mandates are government regulations 
of the provision of employee benefits; thus, particular regulations pertaining to 
health insurance benefit plans are mandates, while workplace antidiscrimination 
rules are not. It remains unclear whether government regulations of workplace 
safety should be counted as a mandate in this context
7. Continuation of coverage benefits provide that the employee can continue to pur 
chase health insurance from the firm at the average group rate following his or her 
voluntary or involuntary termination. See Gruber and Madrian (1993) for more 
details on these laws.
8. Workers' compensation is not mandatory in New Jersey, South Carolina, and 
Texas. See Deere (1994) for an analysis of the implications of voluntary workers' 
compensation in Texas.
9. These are the "manual rates," which provide the basis for firm insurance pay 
ments. The actual cost of insurance may differ from these rates for some firms 
due to within-industry experience rating; see Burton et al. (1985) for details.
10. One may wonder why, if this program is fully valued by workers, a government 
mandate is required. As Summers (1989) discusses, a variety of different market 
failures (such as adverse selection in the choice to insure) may make it difficult for 
these type of arrangements to emerge in the free market even if there is full valua 
tion; government intervention may improve welfare in this case.
11. A third alternative for full shifting to wages would be perfectly elastic demand, 
but this would imply much larger disemployment effects than those found by Gru 
ber and Krueger (1991).
12. The variation in payroll costs in Gruber and Krueger (1991) is over a 10-year 
period; for Anderson and Meyer (1997), there is a 6-year window.
13. Whether this assumption of money illusion is warranted, of course, is the subject 
of a large macroeconomics literature not addressed here.
14. Vergara (1990) showed that, if the social welfare function values poor individuals 
more highly, it will in general be optimal to have some degree of public provision 
financed by income taxation instead of having all of the intervention financed by a 
mandate.
15. These findings have not been without their critics; see Neumark and Wascher 
(1992), and the debate between Neumark and Wascher (1994) and Card, Krueger, 
and Katz (1994).
16. For example, the costs of unemployment insurance are roughly equal across all 
workers, unless some workers are "layoff-prone."
17 Even if the costs can be shifted on average, however, if there is not perfect lump- 
sum shifting, there will still be a distortion to the hours margin which may spill 
over to other groups. This is discussed further below.
18. See Ehrenberg and Smith (1987) for a discussion of U.S. antidiscrimination legis 
lation, which was in place well before the mid 1970s In this discussion, I focus
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only on laws prohibiting discrimination in rates of pay and/or promotion. In fact, 
if there are also binding restrictions on relative hiring practices, then employers 
may be forced to bear the cost of the mandate. If discrimination rules are only 
binding on the hiring side, then they will not impede group-specific shifting in the 
case of full valuation.
19. These findings highlight another margin of employer response not emphasized 
here: reducing other (nonmandated) benefits when there are increases in man 
dated benefits. This margin has the advantage that existing benefits are often 
lump sum, so that they provide a natural means of offsetting new lump-sum costs 
imposed on employers.
20. In Gruber (1994a), I discuss the motivation for my choice of these states as well 
as a large range of empirical issues that are mentioned only briefly here.
21. The results are similar if I use other methods of creating synthetic firms. This 
approach allows for a relatively fine division of the data without creating many 
cells which have just a few women.
22. The pros and cons of this approach, as well as the robustness of the results to 
functional form, are discussed in Gruber (1992).
23 Under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act (ERISA), employers 
who offer health insurance must make that insurance available to any worker who 
works 1,000 hours per year or more.
24. Of course, there are other forms of revenue raising available to the government, 
such as corporate taxation or federal excise taxation. However, the taxation of 
individual incomes is the dominant source of revenue at the federal level, so it 
provides a natural point for comparison; this analysis could readily be extended to 
consider alternative forms of taxation. I only consider the Social Security and 
Disability Insurance payroll tax because the structure of the Medicare payroll tax 
is now fundamentally different (since there is no taxable maximum).
25 Earnings is defined as wage and salary earnings plus self-employment earnings 
plus farm income Where these elements are reported to be negative, I replace 
them with zero, under the assumption that negative earnings reflects tax shelter 
behavior.
26. This is true for a number of reasons, including the following- a less elastic behav 
ioral response of labor supply than of other forms of economic activity, more 
scope for relabeling other forms of income to avoid taxation than is possible with 
labor income (i.e., shifting from dividends to capital gains when the capital gains 
tax rate is lower), and more scope for evasion with other forms of income (i.e., 
claiming artificially high chantable contributions).
27. While the first two comments apply to the removal of any exclusion in the tax 
code, the last does not; some tax breaks, such as the earned income tax credit, are 
progressive.
28. This calculation is done as follows. Assume that the currently marginal tax rate 
on earnings in the uncapped range is 35 percent. Uncapping the payroll tax would 
raise that rate to 47 percent. Navratil finds that the elasticity of earnings with 
respect to after-tax shares is one. Since the after-tax share is reduced by 20 per-
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cent, this would mean that the additional $450 billion in earnings in the uncapped 
range would be reduced to $360 billion. Thus, the uncapped payroll tax would 
raise an additional $43.2 billion, but income tax revenues would be reduced by 
$31.5 billion.
29. A third traditional justification for UI is that it serves as an automatic stabilizer, 
reducing the seventy of recessions by redistributing from good times to bad. 
There is little direct evidence on the automatic stabilization properties of UI. A 
finding that UI smooths consumption at the level of the individual, discussed 
below, may provide indirect evidence on its success as an automatic stabilizer.
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